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INTRODUCTION
Call termination is a monopoly and termination rates should be based on the costs of an efficient operator. There is overwhelming international evidence that cost based termination rates encourage competition and more affordable pricing. In support of high termination rates dominant mobile operators have argued that lowering termination rates will lead to increases in access and usage prices, leading to fewer people being able to afford communication services and resultant lower profits will limit operators" capacity to invest. The opposite has evidently been the case. Lowering termination rates towards the cost of an efficient operator lead to increased competition, lower retail prices and higher mobile subscriber numbers and also the need to invest more to stay competitive. The general trend is that countries with lower termination rates in a Calling Party Pays environment have lower usage cost and higher minutes of use. Mobile call termination is frequently interpreted as one side of a two-sided market that produces a "waterbed-effect" whereby adjustments to pricing in one market automatically create pricing effects in another. However, any of the two sided market models fails to predict market outcomes correctly and waterbed effects cannot be empirically observed following termination rate cuts. The key argument why MTR is not one side of a two-sided market is because MTRs and retail prices are not interdependent (see Stork 2011 for a detailed discussion) for several reasons:
 Termination rates are not prices that are being set to maximise profits, but are contractual arrangements that are unlikely to change unless regulators intervene or it is in the interest of all parties involved to change them.
 An operator cannot increase MTR because its market share increased, something that would be suggested from two-sided markets. Termination rates are mostly symmetrical between mobile operators, and if they are asymmetrical due to regulatory intervention, then the smaller network can charge more. Symmetrical termination rates contradict the two-sided market argument as the larger network gets the same nominal value as the smaller network.
 MTRs are wholesale costs and wholesale revenue at the same time. MTN in Nigeria and South Africa received less in termination revenue but also had to pay less resulting in a higher net profit in 2010 (See Figure 11) . Their termination EBITDA increased.
 MTR reductions can be passed on to subscribers, which leads to a decrease in off-net prices. Should it not be passed on then the operator makes more money for each outgoing minute compensating for the loss in the termination revenue through the MTR reduction. These are concrete choices an operator can make depending on which it thinks will be maximising profits. Figure 11 shows how MTR reductions lead to increased EBITA for MTN in South Africa and Nigeria.
 Products of mobile operators are complex and operators have many products and different off-net, on-net, peak, off-peak, SMS, MMS and data prices for each product. The MTR is just one price, maybe two prices (peak and off-peak). Operators will maximise their profits. Pricing strategies are complex and driven by user profiles, market niches and not by revenue replacement. Reducing prices may well lead to more revenue and increasing prices to less revenue following mobile termination rate cuts.
 Operators can set only their own retail prices and not those of other operators. Yet, the others" off-net prices will influence how many calls are being received.
 If termination rates and retail rates were interdependent then one would also be able to observe increases in termination rates while retail prices decrease.
The "waterbed effect" has not been documented empirically, nor has there been any convincing evidence that call termination is one side of a two-sided market. Valletti"s (2009 and papers are contrary to what can be observed around the world. Neither access nor usage prices increased in response to MTR reductions in the EU or Africa. In fact the opposite is the case, increased competition brings down access and usage prices as MTRs approach the cost of an efficient operator.
An argument put forward is that the waterbed effects exists but it is masked by other developments such as increased competition and decreasing unit costs and can hence not be observed with the naked eye. The question that arises from that is why any policymaker should pay attention to the waterbed effect if it is so limited that one needs advanced econometric techniques to find it. The empirical studies analysing a panel of countries to proof the Waterbed effect produce questionable results for several reasons:
 Mobile penetration rates and mobile retail prices in a country depend on many factors such as number of fixed and mobile operators, sequence of market entry, technologies deployed, market share of operators, user profiles of subscribers, brand loyalty, contractual lock-ins and club effects, price elasticity of demand, income elasticity of demand, levels of disposable income, business models used by operators, penetration of substitute technologies like fixed-line and cable TV, past regulatory interventions and their sequence, regulatory strategies, communication laws and policies and many other social and economic factors. Constructing data sets with enough data points to account for such diversity is impossible. This is acknowledged by the CEG (2009) This is being demonstrated for the case of Kenya in the section below. New entrants that need to gain market share are more likely to pass through termination rate savings to their subscribers, in particular since this brings their off-net prices closer to the on-net prices of dominant operators. Table 2 provides an example of the difference in effective mobile prepaid prices for usage baskets defined by the OECD (OECD, 2006) for dominant operators compared to the cheapest available in a country. It shows that the smaller operators can be as much as 60% cheaper compared to the dominant operator.
 The Valletti (2009 and papers demonstrate that EBITDA margins may be affected by lower termination rates, which is to be expected for some operators since lower termination rates increase competition and lead to lower, not higher, retail prices, though traffic may increase as a result. EBITDA margins of operators that were shielded by high termination rates from competition could decline under competitive pressure if business models are not being adjusted. Also, while dominant operators may have lower EBITDA margins other may have higher as a result of termination rate cuts. Lower EBITDA margins following MTR cuts do not constitute proof of a waterbed effect. Nor do lower EBITDA margins of operators from one country compared to EBITDA margins of operators from another country based on the level of MTR.
 Omitted variables may render models invalid: An example is the paper by Sandbach and Hooft (2009), which tries to estimate the impact of telecommunication policies on mobile penetration and usage without including prices in its models. Including prices, which are undoubtedly significant factors in explaining access and usage in economic theory, could lead to changes in significance levels and coefficients, or even signs of coefficients. Data sets constructed for panel studies are unlikely to capture even the most important variables.
A panel data model based on operators rather than at the country level could potentially deliver better results. Such an approach would need to incorporate all operators of a country. This would increase the data available by a factor of three or four and allow to include significant explanatory variables such as market share and year of market entry into the model. The waterbed effect is a hypothesis about the pricing strategies of operators and as such need to be tested at the operator level.
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A less econometrically sophisticated but more plausible method would, however, be to look into specific cases. Did Vodafone UK increase its retail prices after any MTR reduction in the UK? And how did the smaller operators or the netinterconnect-payers react? This is the approach adopted by this paper. The next section presents African case studies and analyses prices for all operators and all products after MTR reductions.
MOBILE TERMINATION RATES IN AFRICA
African countries have embarked on regulatory interventions that reduce mobile termination rates towards the cost of an efficient operators. While Botswana, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia conducted cost studies, Namibia used a benchmarking approach. Table 3 displays mobile termination rates in currency specified in the regulation and in US cents. Figure 3 compares mobile termination rates in US cents graphically. Plotting these termination rates against the cost of OECD low user baskets for mobile telecommunication (OECD, 2006) for the cheapest product available confirms the link between high termination rates and high prices for the African countries covered (see Figure 4 ).
Figure 4: Mobile termination rates versus cost of usage for RIA countries in 2010
Two cases are being discussed in the following section, Namibia and Kenya. In both countries termination rates were reduced and retail price data been tracked for the period of regulatory intervention. MTN holds a dominant position in NIgeria, South Africa and Botswana. The impact of termination rate cuts is being analysed for these three countries by
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focusing on the retail prices and the financial performance of the dominant operator MTN. The examples show that the Waterbed effect and the two-sided market argument are not only theoretically not applicable but can also empirically be rejected for cost based termination rates.
Case of Kenya
The Despite four players in the mobile market competition has not been sufficiently fair and provided an advantage to Safricom. The cost study conducted by Analysys UK revealed "...instances of market failures where the on-net to off-net price spread is perpetuating a "club effect" which arises when consumers tend to have a preference for a network with a large pool of subscribers in order to benefit from the possibility to call and be called at a lesser calling rate by the largest possible number of subscribers."(CCK, 2010) This determination No 2 of 2010 is ground breaking in several ways. Kenya is the first country to apply the EU recommendations of 2009 by enforcing cost based termination rate caps based on pure LRIC. Kenya has thus the lowest mobile termination rates in Africa of 2.21 Ksh (2.7 US cents). The CCK announced that it will monitor market developments in SMS termination, broadband interconnection, money transfer interconnection and infrastructure sharing and that it will The impact on retail prices has been dramatic. Airtel. Orange and Yu immediately cut their prices after the announcement of the new termination rates. Airtel"s cheapest product for the low OECD usage basket fell by more than 80% between January 2011 to January 2011. Safaricom hesitated to reduce prices initially but had to give in to competitive pressure towards the end of 2010 and cut its prices by 68%. The consequence of lower prices have been an expansion of the market with a subscriber base growth of 9.5% in the quarter July-September 2010. (CCK 2011).
2 Kenya provides a good example how cost based termination rates increase competition in the industry and bring down the prices. Often falling equipment prices, increasing traffic volumes are being cited as masking waterbed effects. In the Kenyan case the reaction to the termination rate reduction has been immediate leaving no doubt about the causal relationship.
Case of Namibia
Market entry to Namibia"s telecommunication sector is restricted. Companies offering voice services are required to have a licence to operate. The induced market structure, monopoly for fixed-line and oligopoly for mobile requires that the market is regulated to safeguard fair competition among the few existing operators and to protect consumer interest. The dispute resolutions of the NCC involved intense consultations with all parties involved, hearings and consultative workshops. Decisions and supporting studies have been made public in the spirit of fair and transparent regulation.
Telecom Namibia and Leo had been net termination rate payers to MTC and the result of the termination rate reduction meant a relieve for both operators. During the termination rate debate in 2009 MTC argued that its EBITDA (earning before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) margin would drop to 36.8% if termination rates were reduced to the cost of an efficient operator. MTC also argued that it would have to reduce investments, increase retail prices and pay less in dividends and taxes to government (Government of Namibia has a 66% share in MTC). MTC"s subscriber numbers increased further to 1.5 million subscribers while Leo also managed to attract new customers, indicating that the lower prices led to an expansion of the market. Prices of MTC have not increased as predicted by two-sided market and waterbed-effect models but instead decreased or remained the same. All of the NCC"s interventions have been win-win interventions. The second mobile licence brought competition to Namibia"s mobile telecommunication sector and with it lower prices, better services, more jobs and more investment.
Resolving the termination rate dispute removed an obstacle to fair competition and lead to further declining prices and increased investments. t allowed Leo and Telecom Namibia to compete with MTC"s on-net prices and removed the implicit subsidy to MTC linked to above cost termination rates. The fairer competition and the subsequent lower prices lead to an expansion of the market and and resulted in record earnings for MTC. Enforcing a price cap that prevents operators to discriminate in their retail prices against other networks removed another obstacle to fair competition. The new retail prices Nigeria"s subscriber numbers did not decrease and retail prices of MTN Nigeria did not increase as predicted by a Waterbed effect. Table 9 shows that MTN"s operational performance improved, subscribers numbers increased and its prices effectively decreased with lower Ratio of ARPU to MOU in 2010. The increase in ARPU can partly be accredited to increase in data revenue. The cost of an OECD High usage basket did not increase during the period February 2010 until March 2011 ( Figure  10 ) in any of the three countries. MTN South Africa and Botswana kept prices stable in nominal terms which means falling prices in real terms. While MTN Nigeria dropped its prices in nominal and real terms. Mascom in Botswana is already the cheapest operator in Botswana and there is no need for it to reduce prices. MTN received less in termination revenue but also had to pay less resulting in a higher net profit in 2010 compared to 2009 (See Figure 11) confirming that termination rate reductions affect operators differently and some make more money than before depending on usage and traffic pattern. It also provides an excellent example for MTRs being revenue and costs. This section demonstrated empirically that subscriber numbers do not decrease and retail prices do not increase following termination rate cuts towards to cost of an efficient operator. MTRs are wholesale costs and wholesale revenue at the same time.
CONCLUSION
The examples of Namibia and Kenya have demonstrated that cost based termination rates are a step towards fair competition and lead to lower retail rices, more investment, more subscriber and ultimately a bigger revenue base. Retail prices in both incidents dropped immediately as a consequence of termination rate cuts and the resulting increase in competitive pressure from smaller operators. The case studies demonstrated that there is no automatic Waterbed effect and that retail prices and termination rates do not constitute a two-sided market. The kenyan case demonstrated how smaller operators immediately reacted after termination rate cuts were announced while the incumbent Safaricom only dropped prices a few weeks later after loosing subscribers to other networks. The case of MTN provides a good example for termination rate cuts affect whole revenues and wholesale costs. For MTN there is no need for revenue replacement strategies since the net effect was positive despite being the dominant operator. It can be expected that countries will follow the example set and that termination rates across the continent will approach the cost of efficient termination over the next couple of years. Fair competition is the best for consumers, investors and economic development. Cost based -termination rates are one further stepping stone towards fair competition.
